This paper considers a series of Kierkegaard’s early “upbuilding discourses” in order to argue that Kierkegaard was never Hegelian. These discourses reveal a dialectical play of non-dialectical difference and tension rather than mediated resolution and progress.Thus Kierkegaard’s is not a logical dialectic of mediation but an existential dialectic of difference—of irremediable paradox. The divisions of existential dividedness do not resolve themselves because they cannot resolve at all; existential difference, as distinct from logical contradiction, is non-dialectical. Kierkegaard’s is a “one-way” dialectic (...) that cannot resolve itself, for eternity, its only (in)conceivable resolution, is incommensurable with it. However, because eternity is not temporally before us as final cause but is rather within us and among us, the apparent simplicity of this one-way dialectic gives way, in the actuality of existence, to the desperate complexity of “redoubling repetition,” whereby the self comes to itself only in the halt of the lesson of death. (shrink)

Lying in an area bounded by the Wabash, Ohio, and Mississippi rivers, the Southern Illinois country is rich in history, folklore, scenery, and natural resources. At about the latitude of southern Virginia, and extending from the flat prairie farmland of central Illinois to the rugged "Illinois Ozarks,” the area is the natural terminal boundary for hundreds of plant species reaching out to all points of the compass. It is also the oldest and most sparsely populated part of Illinois, a region (...) of small towns and independent people, typical of the vast heartland of the U.S.A. Surveying the area in words and pictures the authors sensitively and appreciatively portray the region’s special qualities. An uncommon portrayal of American life in a distinctive region, the book provides a memorable journey both in time and place. (shrink)

"L'oeuvre d'art est une tentative vers l'unique, elle s'affirme comme un tout, comme un absolu et, en même temps, elle appartient à un système de relations complexes [...]. Elle est matière et elle est esprit, elle est forme et elle est contenu [...]. Elle est créatrice de l'homme, créatrice du monde et elle installe dans l'histoire un ordre qui ne se réduit à rien d'autre." Un Eloge de la main complète ce texte. "La main arrache le toucher à sa passivité (...) réceptive, elle l'organise pour l'expérience et pour l'action [...]. Elle se mesure avec la matière qu'elle métamorphose, avec la forme qu'elle transfigure. Educatrice de l'homme, elle le multiplie dans l'espace et dans le temps." [Source : 4e de couv.]. (shrink)

The process of seeking the consent of a patient to a medical procedure is, arguably, one of the most important skills a doctor, or indeed any clinician, should learn. In fact, the very idea that doctors may institute diagnostic or treatment processes of any sort without a patient's consent is utterly counter-intuitive to the modern practice of medicine. It was not always thus, and even now it can be reliably assumed that consent is still not sought and gained appropriately in (...) every clinical encounter. To say that it should be sought and gained in this manner elevates the value of consent to a high level. It can be instructive to ask oneself why such a value might be held to be the case. The answer to this question lies in the philosophical underpinning of clinical consent, which sits within a notion of personal autonomy, and respect for autonomous decision making. (shrink)

World Athletics have introduced regulations preventing female athletes with certain differences in sex development from competing in the female category. We argue these regulations are not justified and should be removed. Firstly, we examine the reasoning and evidence underlying the position that these athletes have a substantial mean difference in performance from other female athletes such that it constitutes an advantage, and argue it is not sufficient. Secondly, if an advantage does exist, it needs to be demonstrated it is unfair. (...) We argue the advantage would not be unfair because to say otherwise relies on a presupposition about whether these athletes are female, which involves contradictory and inconsistent definitions of sex. Thirdly, we contend that even if it is established that there is an advantage and it is unfair, the response of requiring athletes to take testosterone-suppressing medication is not appropriate and is unfair. (shrink)

I wish to defend the claim that given the content and structure of any moral theory we are likely to find palatable, there is no way of uniquely breaking down that theory into either consequentialist or deontological elements. Indeed, once we examine the actual structure of any such theory more closely, we see that it can be classified in either way arbitrarily. Hence if we ignore the metaethical pronouncements often made by adherents of the consequentialist-deontological distinction, we are quickly led (...) to the conclusion that this distinction contributes nothing of consequence to an understanding of moral theory. I will try to show that there are basically two reasons for this. First, what we mean by the terms endemic to the consequentialist-deontological distinction have no unique references to particular states of affairs in actual cases of moral decision making. Hence we may justify any such concrete moral decision by reference to typically consequentialist or deontological reasoning indifferently. Second, scrutiny of actual and viable moral theories reveals a much finer-grained structure than the consequentialist-deontological taxonomy can capture. And it is this structure, rather than simple attention to consequences or principles, that determines practical moral decision making. We would thus do better to develop the richer vocabulary of causes and constituents, goals and effects, states and events (mental, social, or physical). So in the end, the consequentialist-deontological distinction is irrelevant at the normative level of actual moral reasoning, whereas at the metaethical level it crudely schematizes two opposing types of dummy theory, neither of which is convincing, upon reflection, to any practicing moral philosopher. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Post-truth, understood as a turn from collective sense and judgment to nonpublic forms of epistemic justification, is a distinctly rhetorical problem. This article offers, in response, a theorization of knowledge making as the means by which affective and material impingements upon bodies become publicly legible and rhetorically available. For this, the author turns, perhaps unexpectedly, to John Locke. Locke’s works offer the foundations of an empirical theory of rhetoric that embraces the sensible realm not as a conduit to reality (...) but as a space where social connection becomes possible. Locke engages this realm through natural historical inquiry. Tracing this inquiry to his commonplacing practices, the author presents the rhetorical-dialectical topics as a basis for the shared sense and judgment that he pursued and that post-truth demands. The topics, this article argues, guide and enlarge the senses, forming objects of knowledge with which to sustain public life—objects about which plural truths are possible. (shrink)

This study presents a sociological profile of Peruvian female industrialists and some narratives of their struggle for personal independence and entrepreneurial success within the context of global restructuring and local deindustrialization. The study adopts the classical definition of woman's economic independence as a result of women's participation in the world of paid labor.

This essay explores the viability of theologies of nonviolent peacebuilding through reflection on constructive agents under duress. John Howard Yoder’s messianic theology was once a default model of peacebuilding in Christian ethics, but he mixes eschatologies, with problematic results. This essay extends insights from participant observation in Colombia to suggest that if we relate distinct accounts of messianic and gradual eschatologies without mixing them, we articulate a relationship between church and state that is fruitful for theological peacebuilding. This relationship is (...) best described as an interplay that allows for transformative displacement. (shrink)

Im Zentrum des Bandes steht die Frage nach dem Zusammenhang von Erkenntnis- und Wissenschaftstheorie im Kontext der mittelalterlichen Rezeption der Texte des Aristoteles an Hof und Universitäten, insbesondere der für die Epistemologie einschlägigen Passagen in "De anima" und in den "Zweiten Analytiken" sowie ihre spätantike und arabische Vermittlung. In diesem komplexen Rezeptions- und vor allem Transformationsprozeß werden zugleich die wissenschaftlichen und gesellschaftlich-institutionellen Grundlagen für den okzidentalen Prozeß der Rationalisierung und Aufklärung gelegt, deren "Dialektik" nicht nur die Geschichte Europas bis zum (...) heutigen Tag bestimmt. (shrink)

Este artículo intenta desarrollar una deducción del concepto de sumo bien kantiano: esto es, intenta demostrar, de acuerdo con la interpretación de Dieter Henrich acerca de la deducción, que el sumo bien es un fin a la vez que un deber. Apelo a los rasgos de la razón práctica que constituyen la legitimidad de los hechos, la premisa que cualquier deducción debe tener. De acuerdo con Kant, el sumo bien consiste en la felicidad, la virtud y sus relaciones de proporcionalidad (...) y causalidad, tal que la felicidad es proporcional a, y causada por, la virtud. Sostengo, utilizando las nociones kantianas aceptadas, que Kant tiene razones convincentes para concluir que el sumo bien es, de hecho, un fin a la vez que un deber. Si esto es correcto, entonces este argumento ofrece la deducción prometida en mi título. This paper attempts a deduction of Kant's concept of the highest good: that is, it attempts to prove, in accordance with Dieter Henrich's interpretation of the notion of deduction, that the highest good is an end that is also a duty. It does this by appealing to features of practical reason that make up the legitimating facts that serve as the premises that any deduction must possess. According to Kant, the highest good consists of happiness, virtue, and relations of proportionality and causationbetween happiness and virtue, such that happiness is proportional to and caused by virtue. I argue, by drawing on accepted Kantian notions, that Kant had compelling reasons for concluding that the highest good is in fact an end that is also a duty. If correct, then this argument provides the deduction promised in my title. (shrink)

Motivational enhancement in sport – a form of ‘neuro-doping’ – can help athletes attain greater achievements in sport. A key question is whether or not that athlete deserves that achievement. We distinguish three concepts – praiseworthiness, prizeworthiness, and admiration – which are closely related. However, in sport, they can come apart. The most praiseworthy athlete may not be the most prizeworthy, and so on. Using a model of praiseworthiness as costly commitment to a valuable end, and situating prizeworthiness within the (...) boundaries of the sport, we argue that motivational enhancement in some cases can be compatible with desert. (shrink)

This discussion paper considers how seldom recognised theories influence clinical ethics committees. A companion paper examined four major theories in social science: positivism, interpretivism, critical theory and functionalism, which can encourage legalistic ethics theories or practical living bioethics, which aims for theory–practice congruence. This paper develops the legalistic or living bioethics themes by relating the four theories to clinical ethics committee members’ reported aims and practices and approaches towards efficiency, power, intimidation, justice, equality and children’s interests and rights. Different approaches (...) to framing ethical questions are also considered. Being aware of the four theories’ influence can help when seeking to understand and possibly change clinical ethics committee routines. The paper is not a research report but is informed by a recent study in two London paediatric cardiac units. Forty-five practitioners and related experts were interviewed, including eight members of ethics committees, about the work of informing, preparing and supporting families during the extended process of consent to children’s elective heart surgery. The mosaic of multidisciplinary teamwork is reported in a series of papers about each profession, including this one on bioethics and law and clinical ethics committees’ influence on clinical practice. The qualitative social research was funded by the British Heart Foundation, in order that more may be known about the perioperative views and needs of all concerned. Questions included how disputes can be avoided, how high ethical standards and respectful cooperation between staff and families can be encouraged, and how minors’ consent or refusal may be respected, with the support of clinical ethics committees. (shrink)

A book review of Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993). I will pass over her compelling critiques of cost-benefit analysis, rational desire theory, and "consequentialist" moral theories, among many topics she dispatches successfully, with fierce intelligence and wit. Instead I want to focus on the central justificatory strategy that underpins her defense of her pluralist, nonconsequentialist, rational attitude theory of value. Anderson states at the outset that she is not that interested in such (...) metaethical questions as whether value judgments express beliefs or emotions or other attitudes (p. xiii). But I think her own answers to these questions might have implications for normative and pragmatic issues of concern to her. So I want to try tinkering with the metaethical arguments in ways that might streamline her treatment of the normative and pragmatic ones somewhat. (shrink)

In July 2018, the Nuffield Council of Bioethics released its long-awaited report on heritable genome editing. The Nuffield report was notable for finding that HGE could be morally permissible, even in cases of human enhancement. In this paper, we summarise the findings of the Nuffield Council report, critically examine the guiding principles they endorse and suggest ways in which the guiding principles could be strengthened. While we support the approach taken by the Nuffield Council, we argue that detailed consideration of (...) the moral implications of genome editing yields much stronger conclusions than they draw. Rather than being merely ‘morally permissible’, many instances of genome editing will be moral imperatives. (shrink)

In Process and Reality, Whitehead explicitly states what he conceives his task to be: “Speculative Philosophy,” he writes, “is the endeavor to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted.” He then goes on to explain what he means by the key terms in this passage. By ‘in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted’, “I mean,” he explains, “that everything of which we (...) are conscious, as enjoyed, perceived, willed, or thought, shall have the character of a particular instance of the general scheme.” This universality, or all-comprehensiveness, of the system is interpreted in terms of two characteristics: applicability and adequacy. Whitehead explains: “Here ‘applicable’ means that some items of experience are thus interpretable, and ‘adequate’ means that there are no items incapable of such interpretation.” It is these two characteristics of the system which give an explication of the term ‘necessary’ as applied to the system of general ideas: “The metaphysical first principles can never fail of exemplification. We can never catch the actual world taking a holiday from their sway.”. (shrink)